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Power to the People: The Supreme
Court’s Confirmation of State Power in
the Wake of Faithless Electors
GABRIELLE ENGEL*
One of the most cherished American liberties is the right
to vote. Yet, the Constitution does little to protect the integrity of individual voters. Instead, the Founding Fathers created an Electoral College to represent states’ will. Over
time, states enacted laws requiring that electoral votes be
cast to reflect the state popular vote. In 2016, several electors voted for candidates who did not win their state’s popular vote, grounding their actions in a believed constitutional right to vote freely and unencumbered by state outcomes. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Chiafalo
v. Washington, holding that states may bind electoral votes.
This Note finds that the Court’s decision properly reflects
the Framer’s intentions and necessarily avoids political
chaos while emphasizing a need for either state or congressional action to reform the Electoral College.
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INTRODUCTION
The “‘fundamental principle of our representative democracy,’
embodied in the Constitution, [is] that ‘the people should choose
whom they please to govern them.’”1

1

Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 946 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per
curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 848, 879 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
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The right to vote has long been relished as one of the most sacred
elements of a democracy.2 Millions have fought for the right to be
heard by their government, for the right to vote: Black Americans,
women, and still today, convicted felons.3 However, once you pull
back the veil, voting is a much more complicated process than it
appears on its face.4 America is a democratic republic rather than a
direct democracy.5 Therefore, Americans vote for electors, not presidential candidates.6 Until recently, there was not a large problem
with this system.7 After all, most states enacted laws requiring electors to vote for the winners of the state’s popular vote, thereby representing the will of the people.8 But what happens when an elector
violates state law and exercises independent discretion in casting
their electoral vote in the national election? It is a question that has

2

See Democracy (Ancient Greece), NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/democracy-ancient-greece/ (last visited Jan.
24, 2021) (discussing evolution of democracy).
3
See Amy Goodmen & Denis Moynihan, Opinion, Democracy Now | The
Struggle to Vote, from the Suffragettes to Today, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Jan. 4,
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.santacruzsentinel.com/2020/01/04/democracynow-the-struggle-to-vote-from-the-suffragettes-to-today/ (comparing American
women’s suffrage movement to today’s convicted felon movement for right to
vote); see also Shadman Zaman, Violence and Exclusion: Felon Disenfranchisement as a Badge of Slavery, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 256 (2015) (arguing that loss of right to vote is akin to a “badge of slavery”).
4
See generally Colum Lynch, Why is it so Hard to Vote in America?,
FORGIENPOLICY.COM (Nov. 5, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/
2018/11/05/why-is-it-so-hard-to-vote-in-america/ (covering voter suppression
and difficulties of American election process).
5
Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Is the United States of America a Republic or a
Democracy?, WASH. POST (May 13, 2015, 2:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/13/is-the-united-states-ofamerica-a-republic-or-a-democracy/.
6
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2319 (2020).
7
See Faithless Electors, FAIR VOTE [hereinafter Faithless Electors],
https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_electors (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (documenting history of faithless electors).
8
See Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ARCHIVES
[hereinafter Electoral College FAQ], https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/faq (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (discussing “winner-takes-all” system employed by forty-eight states and District of Columbia).
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been toyed with by courts in one way or another since the 1900s.9 A
larger than usual number of so-called “faithless electors”10 in the
2016 presidential election, however, opened the door for Supreme
Court review.11 In a nearly unanimous opinion that preserves modern national election practices, the Court confirmed states have the
power to ensure electoral votes reflect the state popular vote.12
I.
ROADMAP
This Note will compare the constitutional analyses of the United
States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in the landmark faithless electors case Baca v. Colorado Department of State.13 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion appeared
to threaten modern presidential election practices.14 Some view the
9
See, e.g., Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 227–30 (1952) (discussing historical
difficulties of Electoral College’s purpose).
10
Faithless electors are electors who vote for a different presidential or vicepresidential candidate than the one for whom they pledged to vote. Faithless Electors, supra note 7. For more information on the Electoral College, see Electoral
College Fast Facts, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
[hereinafter Electoral College Fast Facts], https://history.house.gov/Institution/Electoral-College/Electoral-College/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
11
See infra Part III.E (discussing faithless electors in 2016); Chiafalo, 140 S.
Ct. at 2320.
12
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2316, 2320. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of
the Court, to which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito,
Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Id. at 2317. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, to which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II. Id.
13
Id.; Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 956 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d
per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (“The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed for the reasons stated in [Chiafalo, 140
S. Ct. 2316].”).
14
The Tenth Circuit struck down a Colorado statute similarly employed by
almost every other state. See Electoral College FAQ, supra note 8 (discussing
widely used “winner-takes-all” system employed by forty-eight states and the
District of Columbia); see also Alexander Gouzoules, The “Faithless Elector”
and 2016: Constitutional Uncertainty After the Election of Donald Trump, 28 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 215, 224–27 (2017) (outlining various deterrence-based
statutory schemes states have enacted to prevent faithless electors). Without such
statutes, many worried about the integrity of American votes. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Supporting Petitioner at 5, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (No. 19-
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opinion as too rigid a reading of the Constitution.15 After all, if states
do not have the inherent power to bind electors to vote in accordance
with the state’s general election popular vote, what value does the
popular vote have?16 Thus, the Supreme Court rightfully stepped in
to quash fears that votes would become meaningless prior to the
2020 election.
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court’s reasoning was a
necessary and sound upholding of federalist principles. Part II will
address the facts and issues surrounding Baca. Part III will discuss
the history of the Electoral College and the evolution of modern voting practices in America. Part IV will compare how the Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court addressed the constitutional issue presented.
Finally, Part V will illustrate how the Court’s reasoning should be
interpreted moving forward.
II.

BACA V. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE: BACKGROUND

A.
Facts
In April 2016, the Colorado Democratic Party nominated Michael Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich (as a group, “the
Electors”) to serve as presidential electors.17 After Secretary Hillary
Clinton and Senator Tim Kaine won the popular vote in November
2016, the group was appointed to serve as three of Colorado’s nine
presidential electors.18
Colorado state law requires presidential electors to cast their ballots for president and vice president in favor of the candidates who
received the highest number of votes in the Colorado general election.19 Weary of the state’s winners, Mr. Baca asked the Colorado
Secretary of State, Wayne Williams, what the consequences would
be if he cast his ballot for different candidates.20 The response was
simple: Colorado would remove any electors who did not cast their
518) (“The public outrage that would arise if a faithless elector could determine
the outcome of a presidential election would cause a Constitutional crisis . . . .”).
15
See infra Part IV (discussing Tenth Circuit’s originalist approach).
16
See infra Part V.A.1 (discussing need for broad state power over electors).
17
Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 902.
18
Id.
19
Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-304(5) (2020).
20
Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 902–03.
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vote in accordance with state law and appoint new electors until all
nine votes were cast for Secretary Clinton and Senator Kaine.21 Mr.
Williams later received guidance from a Colorado court to remove
noncompliant electors and appoint new electors who would vote in
accordance with Colorado law.22
On December 19, 2016, the nine Colorado presidential electors
met to mark their ballots.23 Despite taking an oath to vote for the
winners of the Colorado election, Mr. Baca cast his vote for president for John Kasich.24 Mr. Williams subsequently removed Mr.
Baca and replaced him with an elector who cast her ballot for Secretary Clinton.25 In fear of removal, Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich
then cast their votes for Secretary Clinton as well.26 After voting on
the presidential candidates completed, Mr. Baca attempted to vote
for Senator Kaine for vice president.27 Mr. Williams did not count
his vote and referred Mr. Baca to the Colorado Attorney General for
criminal investigation.28
B.
Procedural History
Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado, to which Mr. Baca
joined.29 The Electors sought to hold Colorado responsible for its
deprivation of their supposed constitutional rights under Article II
and the Twelfth Amendment.30 The Electors grounded this claim
under Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code.31 This section provides that:

21

Id. at 903.
Id.
23
Id. at 904.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id; see Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-01937-WYD-NYW, 2018
WL 10322062 (D. Colo. Apr. 10, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 935 F.3d 887
(10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
30
Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 904.
31
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
22
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[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .32
The relief sought was threefold. The Electors requested that the
court (1) find the Colorado Department of State (“Colorado”) violated the Electors’ constitutional rights, (2) declare the Colorado law
requiring presidential electors to vote in compliance with the state
majority winner unconstitutional, and (3) award nominal damages.33
In response, Colorado filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the
Electors lacked standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and, alternatively, failed to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).34 The District Court dismissed the
complaint.35 The Electors appealed to the Tenth Circuit,36 which
32

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-304 (2020); Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935
F.3d at 904.
34
Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 904; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
35
Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 904.
36
Id. at 887. Several questions of justiciability surfaced at the Tenth Circuit;
most notably, arguments surrounding the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Colorado’s waiver that it is not a “person.” Id. at 905. The Tenth Circuit noted
that “it is a well-established principle . . . that normally the [c]ourt will not decide
a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose the
case[,]” and therefore assessed whether the complaint itself failed because Colorado is not a person under § 1983. Id. at 928–29 (quoting Bond v. United States,
572 U.S. 844, 855 (2014)); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit
found the requirements of § 1983 were not jurisdictional requirements. Baca v.
Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 929. Instead, the statute’s requirements are elements of the claim, making Colorado’s waiver of the “person” element viable. Id.
Thus, even though courts should raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte, no jurisdiction issues were present, and the court proceeded to adjudicate the constitutional issue. Id. At the Supreme Court, the Justices entertained questions of justiciability at oral argument but did not address such issues in the decision. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 42–43, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca 140 S. Ct. 2316
(2020) (No. 19-518). The Justices voiced concerns regarding Colorado’s waiver
33
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published a holding that unsettled widely accepted voter expectations.37
The Tenth Circuit found that the Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the states the right to bind electoral votes;38 therefore, any
power to do so would have to be granted under Article II, which
contains no such express delegation.39 Effectively, the court determined that presidential electors may exercise independent discretion
when voting, unencumbered by state interference.40
Colorado filed a petition for writ of certiorari,41 to which Mr.
Baca responded with a petition in support;42 additionally, numerous
states, scholars, and organizations filed amicus briefs urging the

of § 1983’s “person” requirement: Justice Breyer stated, “[t]he problem that I
view is that then any two people, a plaintiff and defendant, who would like an
issue decided by us, simply have to waive enough matters so that it has to come
before us because it’s not jurisdictional.” Id. at 13. However, ultimately, it appears
the Court liberally applied the semantics of § 1983 and conceded to the waiver
because it believed that adjudicating the issue was necessary to avoid political
chaos. See id. at 46 (Justice Alito discussing potential political chaos if electors
are granted a constitutional right to unencumbered voting).
37
See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 887; Noah Feldman, Opinion,
Appeals Court Opens the Door to Electoral College Chaos, BLOOMBERG OP.
(Aug. 25, 2019, 9:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/201908-25/electoral-college-chaos-is-possible-over-faithless-elector-ruling.
38
Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 946.
39
Id. In a 3-1 opinion, the court reversed the dismissal of Mr. Baca’s claim
and remanded the case to the district court, holding that Mr. Baca stated a viable
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 956. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit found
that out of the three Electors, only Mr. Baca had standing to pursue a claim because he suffered an actual injury. Id. at 922. Mr. Baca was removed, and his votes
were nullified, while Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich only suffered a fear of removal
which caused them to vote in accordance with Colorado state law. See id at 921.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the District Court’s ruling in part and Ms. Baca’s
and Mr. Nemanich’s claims were dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). Id. at 956.
40
See id.
41
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316
(2020) (No. 19-518) [hereinafter Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
42
Respondents’ Brief in Support of Certiorari, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca,
140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-518) [hereinafter Baca Brief in Support of Certiorari]
(urging for Supreme Court review due to inconsistent federal guidance).
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Supreme Court to hear the issue.43 Given the immediacy of the 2020
presidential election, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 17, 2020.44
The Supreme Court consolidated the case with Chiafalo v.
Washington, a similar litigation arising from the actions of faithless
electors in Washington during the 2016 presidential election.45 Both
cases addressed state laws restricting electoral independence;46
therefore, one opinion delivered by Justice Kagan applied to both
cases.47
C.
Holding
The Supreme Court applied Article II liberally, finding that
states possess “‘the broadest power of determination’ over who becomes an elector.”48 After considering long-established state practices of requiring electors to reflect the popular vote when casting
ballots, the Court found that state power to appoint electors under
Article II necessarily encompasses the ability to impose restrictions
on voting.49 Concurring in the opinion, Justice Thomas found that

43

See Brief for South Dakota et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-518); Brief of Professor
Michael T. Morley as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Colo. Dep’t of
State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-518) (also filed in Chiafalo v. Washington,
140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (No. 19-465)); Brief of Amicus Curiae National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Supporting Petitioner, supra note
14; Brief of the Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Washington & Colorado, Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19518) (also filed in Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-465)); Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Colorado Democratic Party in Support of Petitioner, Colo. Dep’t of
State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (No. 19-518).
44
Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (mem.) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
45
See id.; Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322.
46
Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 903–04; In re Guerra, 441 P.3d
807, 807–08 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom, Chiafalo v. Washington 140 S. Ct.
2316 (2020).
47
Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. at 2316; Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at
2323.
48
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1,
27 (1982)).
49
Id. at 2327–28 (“State election laws evolved to reinforce that development,
ensuring that a State’s electors would vote the same way as its citizens.”).
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state power to enact such laws does not stem from Article II;50 rather, Justice Thomas reasoned that the Tenth Amendment allows
states to exercise this power because the Constitution is otherwise
silent on the issue.51
III.
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: THEN & NOW
Before assessing the courts’ constitutional interpretations, it is
important to understand the history behind the creation of the Electoral College and its function in present day elections.
A.
Creation of the Electoral College
The Electoral College was created to ensure that a president
“with ‘talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity’ could
not achieve office without the necessary qualifications or the appropriate temperament.”52 Indeed, today it is easy to envision the type
of presidential behavior about which the Framers were worried.
The creation of the Electoral College reflects qualms the Framers had with the creation of a presidential power and issues with
early state constitutions.53 Originally, state governors had smaller
powers than today and were chosen by the state legislatures.54 Accordingly, the Virginia Plan proposed that, likewise, the “national
Executive . . . be chosen by the National Legislature.”55 By contrast,
the competing New Jersey Plan recommended that Congress consist
of equal state representatives instead of proportionally allocated
50

Id. at 2329 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. (“I would resolve this case by simply recognizing that ‘[a]ll powers that
the Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to the
States are controlled by the people of each State.’” (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting))).
52
Gouzoules, supra note 14, at 218 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 354
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Gideon ed.
2001)).
53
See Gouzoules, supra note 14, at 218–19.
54
Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, Constitutional Construction, and the
Problem of Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 921 (2017). Only three
states, New York, Vermont, and Massachusetts, used an alternative method for
choosing an executive state power. Id. at 921–22.
55
Id. at 922 (quoting 3 JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 57
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1902)).
51
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state representatives.56 However, state familiarity with governors
appointed by the legislature highlighted the need for the national executive power to be independent.57
The Framers discussed various options for ensuring independent
appointment; importantly, the Framers considered the prospect of a
general election.58 Early in the Constitutional Convention, James
Wilson pointed out that the New York and Massachusetts constitutions, which did not appoint state governors chosen by the state legislature, resulted in governors “whose merits have general notoriety.”59 However, Framers such as George Mason were not easily
convinced.60 So, Wilson came back with a more detailed proposal
in which states were divided into electoral districts, each of which
would elect an elector who would then vote for the president and
vice president.61 Wilson’s proposal was largely accepted and seen
as a mode of “election by the people.”62 This was true because, compared to the appointment of state governors through the state legislature, this method gave citizens and states considerable control over
elections.63
The instructions for conducting the presidential election are prescribed in Article II, which vests power in the executive branch and
sets forth the method by which the United States selects its president
and vice president.64 Appointing electors is a power that has long
been vested to each individual state.65 Article II, Section 1, Clause
2 establishes that:
[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,
equal to the whole Number of Senators and
56

Whittington, supra note 54, at 922. The New Jersey Plan and the Virginia
Plan highlighted the opposing interests of small versus large states. See id. at 923.
57
See id. at 923–24.
58
Id. at 924.
59
Id. (quoting MADISON, supra note 55, at 63).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 924–25 (quoting MADISON, supra note 55, at 102).
63
See id. at 925–26 (“[T]he Electoral College was a compromise that minimized the apparent problems with either congressional selection of the president
or a national popular vote.”).
64
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
65
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the
United States, shall be appointed an Elector.66
Article II, Section 1, initially called for electors to cast two votes.67
These votes were then counted by the House of Representatives, and
the candidate with the highest number of votes became president
while the candidate with the second highest number of votes became
vice president.68 Shortly after, the problem arose that an election
could result in a president and vice president who identified with
different political parties.69 That issue came to fruition in both 1796
and 1800.70
B.
Enactment of the Twelfth Amendment
In 1796, the presidential election resulted in a split-party president and vice president.71 Federalists supported John Adams for
president and Thomas Pinckney for vice president, while Anti-Federalists called for electors to support Thomas Jefferson for president
and Aaron Burr for vice president.72 This rise in party-line voting
did not align well with the Constitution because casting an electoral
ballot for both Adams and Pinckney respectively could not ensure
that Adams would become president with Pinckney serving as his
66

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
68
Electoral College & Indecisive Elections, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Electoral-College/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
69
Id.
70
Id. In 1800, efficiency became a concern. See id. The presidential election
resulted in the following electoral vote totals: seventy-three votes each for Aaron
Burr and Thomas Jefferson, sixty-five votes for John Adams, sixty-four votes for
Charles Pinckney, and one vote for John Jay. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 1024 (1801).
Because two candidates received an equal number of electoral votes, the vote
shifted to the House of Representatives. Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d
887, 947 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (discussing
the presidential election of 1800). It took thirty-six rounds of polling for the House
to elect Jefferson as the president. Id.
71
Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 947.
72
CONST. RTS. FOUND., The Troubled Elections of 1796 and 1800, BILL RTS.
ACTION, Fall 2016, at 2.
67
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vice president.73 Instead, numerous Federalist electors withheld
their second ballot and did not cast a ballot for Thomas Pinckney.74
This was an effort to ensure that Pinckney would receive just a few
votes short of Adams but enough to win the vice presidency.75 This
resulted in seventy-one votes for John Adams, sixty-eight votes for
Thomas Jefferson, and fifty-nine votes for Thomas Pinckney.76
Therefore, John Adams, a Federalist, was president alongside Vice
President Thomas Jefferson, an Anti-Federalist.77
In addition to resulting in a split-party president and vice president, the 1796 election is also considered the first emergence of an
elector exercising independent discretion.78 In 1796, Pennsylvania
selected presidential electors by popular vote.79 The flawed Pennsylvania law, however, provided the governor with a limited amount
of time to appoint the winners, resulting in the governor selecting
electors prior to the completion of tallying votes.80
Samuel Miles, a Pennsylvania elector, led a slate of fifteen electors who supported Federalism.81 This group of electors was expected to vote for John Adams.82 Although Adams was not an outright Federalist, it was largely known that he was the candidate who
would support federalist ideals; conversely, Thomas Jefferson, a
“firm Republican,” did not.83 When it came time for the governor to
appoint Pennsylvania’s electors, thirteen electors supporting Jefferson had won the popular vote.84 However, Greene County,
73
See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 947 (explaining that the 1796
election result “created a ‘situation that was manifestly intolerable’” (quoting Ray
v. Blair 343 U.S. 214, 224 n.11 (1952))).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. (“The 1796 electoral college vote consequently resulted in a President
who, although disclaiming political affiliation, strongly favored Federalists, serving with a Vice President who was the leader of the opposing party.”).
78
See Electoral College Fast Facts, supra note 10; Faithless Electors, supra
note 7 (documenting history of faithless electors).
79
See JEFFREY L. PASLEY, THE FIRST PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST 361–63 (2013)
(describing Pennsylvania’s 1796 election).
80
See id. at 362.
81
See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 948.
82
Id.
83
Id. (quoting PASLEY, supra note 79, at 354).
84
PASLEY, supra note 79, at 363.
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Pennsylvania, had not yet been tallied.85 Nonetheless, the governor
appointed Miles and Robert Coleman, two Federalist electors, to be
the state’s remaining presidential electors.86 Ultimately, the voting
showed that two Anti-Federalist, Jefferson-supporting electors
should have been appointed for Greene County.87 The electors who
won the popular vote insisted that they replace Miles and Coleman
but were refused.88 Thus, people were frustrated and wished for
Miles and Coleman to support the “will of the majority” and vote
for Jefferson.89 Out of fear, or moral desire to represent the majority,
Miles voted for Jefferson.90 However, many were quick to criticize
him for going against the will of the Federalists.91 In fact, a Philadelphia Newspaper headline reflected the frustration and anger voters felt, reading: “What, do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for
me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be President?
No! I chose him to act, not to think.”92
In 1800, Electoral College procedures again resulted in a rival
president and vice president, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr,
which convinced the Founders that a change was necessary.93 Accordingly, the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified
in 1804.94 The Twelfth Amendment, which reworked Article II, Section 1, Clause 3, constructs the Electoral College voting mechanisms
used today.95 Electors are to meet and cast their ballots in their respective states.96 Instead of casting two ballots generally, electors
cast distinct and separate ballots for president and vice president.97
A final list of all votes cast for president and vice president is signed
85

See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 948.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See PASLEY, supra note 79, at 363.
90
Id. Because Miles ran as a Federalist elector, many consider him the first
faithless elector. See Faithless Electors, supra note 7.
91
See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d at 948.
92
Id. (citing STEPHEN J. WAYNE, THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 6 (10th
ed. 2016)).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 932.
95
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
96
Id.
97
Id. Electors can only vote for one candidate from their respective state. See
id.
86
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and certified by each elector.98 This list is then sealed and transmitted by the electors to the president of the Senate, who opens and
counts the votes in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives.99 The candidate who receives the majority of the electoral votes for president and the candidate who receives the majority
of the electoral votes for vice president shall assume their respective
offices.100 In the event no majority exists for the presidency, the
House of Representatives casts ballots on the top three candidates
who received the most electoral votes for president.101 Whereas, if
no majority exists for the vice president, the Senate casts ballots on
the top two candidates who received the most electoral votes for vice
president.102 Thus, the Twelfth Amendment restructured how electoral votes are cast.
C.
Modern Treatment of the Electoral College
Many Americans are under the impression that our president is
elected in November after each state has conducted its general election.103 However, the Electoral College actually casts its ballots in
December.104 In fact, Americans vote for electors who represent political parties in the hopes that the elector will cast his or her vote for
that party’s nominee.105 Today, forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia award all electoral votes to electors who represent the political party of the state’s popular vote winners.106

98

Id.
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. A quorum “of a member or members from two-thirds of the states” is
necessary for such a vote to take place, and a candidate must receive a majority
of the House of Representative votes cast. Id.
102
Id. A quorum “two-thirds of the whole number of Senators” is necessary
for such a vote to take place, and a candidate must receive a majority of the Senate
votes cast. Id.
103
See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 54, at 906 (clarifying and illustrating
presidential election process).
104
Id.
105
See id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
106
Electoral College FAQ, supra note 8. This system is referred to as the
“winner-takes-all” model. Id. Main and Nebraska utilize an alternative plan
known as the “district plan.” Id.
99
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An overwhelming majority of electors are faithful to their pledge
to support a particular candidate.107 This faithfulness led to state
confidence in electoral pledges and influenced states to remove individual electoral candidate names from ballots, and replace them
with “the presidential candidate of the national conventions” which
would be counted as “a vote for the party’s nominees for the Electoral College.”108 These “short-form ballots,” as Colorado argued,
provide voters with “no basis for judging the prospective electors’
qualifications or trustworthiness, let alone uncovering their identities,” and “[a] voter . . . understandably believes that he or she is
casting [his or her] ballot for actual presidential and vice presidential
candidates.”109 Colorado correctly highlighted the confusion Americans have regarding U.S. voting procedures.110 Short-form ballots
arguably disguise such state elections as ones where the people directly vote for presidential and vice presidential candidates.111
Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia passed statutes
to protect voters from elector discretion in one form or another
through pledge laws.112 Pledge laws require electors to take an oath
that they will vote for the candidates to whom they have pledged
their support.113 Yet, a majority of states that require electors to take
a pledge do not impose any penalty on electors who break the
107

See Faithless Electors, supra note 7 (documenting history of faithless elec-

tors).
108

Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 949 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per
curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229 (1952)).
109
Id. at 950 (quoting Appellee’s Response Brief at 58–59, Baca v. Colo.
Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887 (No. 18-1173)).
110
See id.
111
Id. In reality, people vote for electors, who today represent political parties,
under the impression that the elector will cast their vote for that party’s nominee.
See Whittington, supra note 54, at 906.
112
Faithless Elector State Laws, FAIR VOTE [hereinafter, Faithless Elector
State Laws], https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_elector_state_laws (last updated
July. 7, 2020). Seventeen states including, Texas, New York, Louisiana, Idaho,
Illinois, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, and Georgia do not impose pledge laws. See id. While a lack of state pledge laws potentially
signals support for independent electoral discretion, it is more likely due to the
rare occurrence of faithless electors. See, e.g., Faithless Electors, supra note 7
(describing history of faithless electors).
113
Faithless Elector State Laws, supra note 112. This means the elector will
vote for the candidates of the political party the elector represents. Id.
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pledge.114 In fact, those states, plus the District of Columbia, still
submit all electoral votes to Congress.115 Alternatively, fifteen states
enacted statutes supplementing pledge laws with sanctions,116 including civil liability, criminal liability, and removal from the Electoral College.117
Five states impose penalties on electors who break their pledges:
North Carolina imposes a civil fine,118 while California,119 New
Mexico,120 Oklahoma,121 and South Carolina122 impose criminal liability ranging from a misdemeanor to a felony. On top of these
sanctions, Oklahoma and North Carolina refuse to transmit faithless
votes to Congress.123
The most popular mechanism for enforcing pledge laws is removal. Fourteen states do not submit votes that violate a pledge to
Congress;124 this includes Colorado.125 Colorado law implements a
“removal-and-replacement system,”126 which means that electors
who “refuse to act,” as required by pledge, are replaced with new
electors until all electors act in accordance with Colorado law and
cast their ballot for the winners of the Colorado popular vote.127 In
the same vein, six states have enacted the Uniform Faithful

114

Id. Sixteen states plus the District of Columbia do not impose pledge laws.
Id. These states include Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii, Wyoming, Wisconsin, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Virginia, Ohio, Maryland, Delaware, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont. See id.
115
See id.
116
See id.
117
See id.; Chris Tognotti, How Faithless Electors Can Be Criminally
Charged, BUSTLE (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.bustle.com/articles/191444-criminal-charges-for-faithless-electors-are-highly-uncommon-but-legal-in-thesestates.
118
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-212.
119
CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906, 18002 (Deering 2020).
120
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-9 (LexisNexis 2020).
121
OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 10-102, § 10-108, § 10-109.
122
S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-80 (2020).
123
Faithless Elector State Laws, supra note 112. Despite imposing criminal
liability, California, New Mexico, and South Carolina did not enact laws regarding the cancelation of faithless votes. See id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 2.
127
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-304(1) (2020).
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Presidential Electors Act (the “UFPEA”) to enforce removal.128 The
UFPEA calls for electors to pledge their votes to the candidates of
the political party they represent or face removal and replacement.129
Under “winner-take-all” schemes, the UFPEA ensures that all electoral votes are cast for the winners of the state popular vote.
D.
The Surge in Faithless Electors
The results of the November 2016 presidential election left
many Americans upset with the Electoral College system.130 This
was not just because of elector independence, but it was also because
of a distrust in the Electoral College as a whole.131 Democrats in
particular were angered by Donald Trump’s Electoral College majority, despite Secretary Clinton’s win of the national popular
vote.132 Senator Barbara Boxer expressed wishes to abandon the
Electoral College through a Constitutional amendment.133 She proclaimed the Electoral College to be an “outdated, undemocratic system that does not reflect our modern society.”134 What ensued was
a slew of people rushing to take a closer look at how the electoral
vote in December 2016 might be swayed.135 Political activist Daniel
Brezenoff began a movement, calling for electors to “exercise

128
See Faithless Elector State Laws, supra note 112. Amidst varying state
laws, the Uniform Law Commission pushes for all states to enact the UFPEA. See
Faithful Presidential Electors Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=6b56b4c1-5004-48a5add2-0c410cce587d (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
129
UNIF. FAITHFUL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS ACT §§ 4, 6(c) (UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2010).
130
Whittington, supra note 54, at 912.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. After the 2016 election, Senator Boxer introduced a bill calling for the
amendment of the Constitution to abolish the Electoral College and ensure “[o]ne
person, one vote[.]” Corky Siemaszko, Senator Boxer Calls for Abolishing Electoral College in Wake of Trump Win, NBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2016, 6:09 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-day/sen-boxer-calls-abolishing-electoral-college-n684386.
134
Siemaszko, supra note 133.
135
See Whittington, supra note 54, at 912.
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judgment and choice” in evaluating the candidates for president.136
He hoped that electors would either honor the national popular vote
in favor of Clinton or would recognize then-presidential candidate
Trump’s “danger to the Constitution” and cast their vote for an alternative candidate.137
One might argue that the Electoral College was created precisely
for times such as this. Such an argument was made by so-called
“Hamilton Electors,” who urged electors not to cast their votes for
Donald Trump.138 These electors argued that Alexander Hamilton
intended electors to “act as a constitutional failsafe against those
lacking the qualification for becoming president.”139 Many clamored to support this notion.140 The viewpoint was supported by the
notion that the Framers “self-consciously limited the people’s
voice” and created a Constitution that mirrored John Adams’ view
that “[d]emocracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and
murders itself.”141

136

Id. at 912–13 (quoting Albert Kaufman, An Open Letter to the Electors,
BLUEOREGON (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.blueoregon.com/2016/12/open-letter-electors/); see also Tierney McAfee, Inside One Man’s “Hail Mary” Attempt
to Yet Elect Hillary Clinton President, PEOPLE (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/news/inside-one-man-hail-mary-152440975.html.
137
McAfee, supra note 136.
138
HAMILTON ELECTORS, http://www.hamiltonelectors.com/about [https://
web.archive.org/web/20170126025006/www.hamiltonelectors.com/about] (last
visited Jan 24, 2021).
139
Id.
140
Whittington, supra note 54, at 914.
141
See Peter Beinart, The Electoral College Was Meant to Stop Men Like
Trump from being President, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/the-electoral-college-was-meant-to-stopmen-like-trump-from-being-president/508310/ (quoting Letter from John Adams
to John Taylor (Dec. 17, 1814) FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6371). Some argue that while many
Americans feel that the Framers created a superior democratic society, in fact the
Framers created a system with both democratic and non-democratic features. See
id. These non-democratic features include the Electoral College and the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. Id.
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E.
Varied Treatment of State Appointment Power
Congress has never failed to give power to a vote submitted to
the Senate from a faithless elector.142 In 2016 alone, thirteen electors
voted inconsistently.143 All thirteen of those votes were counted by
Congress.144 And, before Colorado did so in 2016, no state had ever
removed an elector for voting anomalously.145
The 2016 election resulted in electors from four states—Colorado, Minnesota, Washington, and California—filing suit to challenge their state electoral laws.146 All four cases were initially dismissed.147 Notably, only in the Tenth Circuit did the electors prevail.148 Yet, the state supreme courts of Ohio,149 Alabama,150 and
Kansas151 all expressed that elector independence in one form or another stems from the Constitution.152 Interestingly, Colorado’s

142

Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 949 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d per
curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
143
Id. at 950. The thirteen anomalous presidential electors in 2016 resulted in
the following votes: three votes for Colin Powell (Washington), one vote for John
Kasich (Texas), one vote for Ron Paul (Texas), one vote for Bernie Sanders (Hawaii), and one vote for Faith Spotted Eagle (Washington). Id. (citing 163 CONG.
REC. H189 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017)).The rest were for the electoral votes for vice
president: two votes for Elizabeth Warren (Hawaii and Washington), one vote for
Maria Cantwell (Washington), one vote for Susan Collins (Washington), one vote
for Carly Fiorina (Texas), and one vote for Winona LaDuke (Washington). Id.
(citing 163 CONG. REC. H189 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017)).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 949.
146
Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 8.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 80 N.E.2d 899, 908–09 (Ohio 1948) (“It
is only by force of a moral obligation, not a legal one, that the presidential electors
pledged to certain candidacies fulfill their pledges after election.”).
150
See Opinion of the Justices No. 87, 34 So. 2d 598, 600 (1948) (finding “the
action of the electors in casting their votes by ballot is governed by the Federal
Constitution” and such votes are bound to party nominees only by “virtue of their
own consciences”).
151
See Breidenthal v. Edwards, 46 P. 469, 470 (1896) (“[I]f these electors
should be chosen they will be under no legal obligation to support Sewall, Watson,
or any other person named by a political party, but they may vote for any eligible
citizen of the United States.”).
152
Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 10.
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petition for certiorari noted a larger number of state court decisions
have upheld state power to bind electors.153
During the 2016 election, Washington imposed civil penalties
on electors who did not comply with state law.154 Still, Washington
submitted those electors’ ballots to the Senate.155 In Chiafalo, the
Washington Supreme Court noted that nothing in Article II suggests
that electors have an absolute freedom to vote as they please.156
Washington law, at the time of litigation, imposed a civil penalty of
up to $1,000 on electors who did not vote for the winners of the state
popular vote as required by state law.157 The court felt that nothing
about Washington’s state law interfered with the purposes of the
Twelfth Amendment.158 The California Supreme Court came to the
same conclusion for a similar law, finding that an elector’s “sole
function is to perform a service which has come to be nothing more
than clerical—to cast, certify and transmit a vote already predetermined.”159 The California Supreme Court recognized that
[i]t was originally supposed by the framers of our national constitution that the electors would exercise an
independent choice, based upon their individual
judgment. But in practice so long established as to be
recognized as part of our unwritten law, they
[act] . . . “simply to register the will of the appointing
power in respect of a particular candidate.”160

153

Id. at 10–12; see, e.g., Spreckels v. Graham, 194 Cal. 516, 531–33 (1924)
(“[T]he fact remains that the sole public duty to be performed by [electors] after
election involves no exercise of judgment or discretion . . . .”).
154
In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), aff’d sub nom, Chiafalo v.
Washington 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
155
Id. Later, in 2019, Washington adopted the UFPEA. See Faithless Elector
State Laws, supra note 112; Faithful Presidential Electors Act, supra note 128.
156
Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 10–11; see In re
Guerra, 441 P.3d at 807.
157
In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 808.
158
Id. at 810, 814.
159
Spreckels v. Graham, 194 Cal. 516, 531 (1924).
160
Id. (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892)).
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There, the California court made an argument that the Tenth Circuit
expressly rejected.161
On the one hand, in Chiafalo, the Washington electors who did
not cast their votes for the winners of the popular vote filed petitions
for certiorari to the Supreme Court, arguing that the civil liabilities
imposed on them were unconstitutional.162 On the other hand, in
Baca, Mr. Baca argued that Colorado made an “unprecedented decision to actually cancel the vote of a presidential elector.”163 While
each case presented different facts, there was “no meaningful legal
distinction in the question at the heart of each” case.164 Therefore,
the Supreme Court was called upon to answer one question: Can
states control electoral votes through state pledges?165
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION IN CHIAFALO
The Supreme Court’s opinion can be organized into the following sections: (1) application of Supreme Court precedent; (2) application of Article II and its impact on state power to appoint electors;
and (3) application of the Tenth Amendment and powers reserved
to the states.
A.
Legal Precedent: A Case of First Impression
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the original purpose of
the Electoral College has evolved.166 Yet, because faithless electors
have been few and far between, legal precedent on elector
161

Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 949–52 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d
per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
162
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316
(2020) (No. 19-465) [hereinafter Washington Electors Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
163
Baca Brief in Support of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 1–2.
164
Id.
165
See Washington Electors Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 162, at
3–5; Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at i.
166
See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892) (“Doubtless it was supposed that the electors would exercise a reasonable independence and fair judgment in the selection of the Chief Executive, but experience soon demonstrated
that . . . they were so chosen simply to register the will of the appointing power in
respect of a particular candidate. In relation, then, to the independence of the electors, the original expectation may be said to have been frustrated.”).
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independence is sparse.167 However, the topic of electoral independence was briefly addressed by the Court in Ray v. Blair.168 In Ray,
the Court faced a similar question regarding electoral pledges required by political parties in primary elections.169 There, it held that,
in states that permit political parties to (1) select electoral nominees
through a primary election and (2) set qualifications for the electoral
candidates, a political party may require candidates to pledge support to the party’s nominees without infringing on the Constitution.170
The Court recognized that Article II, Section 1, grants states the
power to “appoint electors in such manner, subject to possible constitutional limitation, as it may choose.”171 In Ray, Alabama allowed
political parties to utilize primary elections to select their candidates
for the Electoral College.172 The chairman of the Alabama Executive
Committee of the Democratic Party denied certification of Edmund
Blair as a candidate for presidential elector in the Democratic primary.173 Blair refused to take a pledge, required by all Democratic
candidates, to support “the nominees of the National Convention of
the Democratic Party for President and Vice President of the United
States.”174
Mr. Blair argued that such a pledge violated the “freedom of a
federal elector to vote in his Electoral College for his choice for
President.”175 The Court disagreed, finding that “presidential electors exercise a federal function in balloting for President and Vice
President, but they are not federal officers or agents any more than
the state elector who votes for congressmen. They act by authority
of the state that in turn receives its authority from the federal constitution.”176 Thus, Article II, Section 1, creates an anomaly; electors
play a unique role in that they cast a ballot for the highest office of
167

See, e.g., Faithless Electors, supra note 7 (documenting history of faithless
electors).
168
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228–31 (1952).
169
See id. at 215–18.
170
Id. at 231.
171
Id. at 227 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, §1).
172
See id. at 227.
173
Id. at 215.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 224–25 (emphasis added).
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the national government but are under the control of their state government.177 The Court paid particular attention to societal practices
and noted that:
[h]istory teaches that electors were expected to support the party nominees. Experts in the history of
government recognize the longstanding practice. Indeed, more than twenty states do not print the names
of the candidates for electors on the general election
ballot. Instead, in one form or another they allow a
vote for the presidential candidate of the national
conventions to be counted as a vote for his party’s
nominees for the electoral college.178
Pledges used by political parties were essential to ensuring party
candidates in the general election reflected “the philosophy and
leadership of that party.”179 The Court reasoned that, although the
Constitution allows electors to vote by ballot, nothing in the Constitution limits electors from pledging their votes.180 In fact, it stated,
“The suggestion that in the early elections candidates for electors—
contemporaries of the Founders—would have hesitated, because of
constitutional limitations, to pledge themselves to support party
nominees in the event of their selection as electors is impossible to
accept.”181
Ultimately, Ray dealt with electoral candidacy in a primary election.182 Primary elections are distinct from general elections in that
the elector is free to run independently.183 Alabama did not prohibit
candidates who did not wish to align with political parties from participating in the primary election.184 Thus, the Court reasoned that
177

Id. at 225, 227 (explaining that Article II grants states the “right to appoint
electors in such manner, subject to possible constitutional limitations, as it may
choose”); U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1.
178
Ray, 343 U.S. at 228–29 (footnotes omitted).
179
Id. at 227.
180
Id. at 228.
181
Id.
182
See id. at 215–16.
183
Id. at 230 (“A candidacy in the primary is a voluntary act of the applicant.”).
184
Id. (“The state offers him opportunity to become a candidate for elector on
his own terms, although he must file his declaration before the primary.”).
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whether the Constitution granted electoral independence had no
bearing on the issue at hand.185
In Chiafalo, the Supreme Court faced a different question––
whether a state requirement to pledge support for a particular candidate in the general election for the presidency is legally enforceable.186 Under Colorado law, electors in the general election were
provided with no alternative.187 If Colorado electors chose not to
vote for the candidate winning the Colorado popular vote, they faced
removal.188 Alternatively, in Ray, if electors chose not to comply
with party requirements, they could run independently.189 Even with
the legal precedent set under Ray, the Supreme Court agreed the situation in Chiafalo presented an issue of first impression.190
B.
Article II: State Appointment Power
By examining both historical and modern election practices, the
Supreme Court majority applied a pragmatic interpretation of Article II, overturning the Tenth Circuit’s originalist reading.
1. MANNER OF APPOINTMENT
The Supreme Court held that state pledge laws do not violate the
Constitution because Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, grants states a
broad power to appoint electors.191 The Constitution empowers
states to “appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a number of electors . . . .”192 As argued by Colorado, the
word “Manner”193 endows states with the authority “to attach conditions to their appointment.”194 Colorado pointed to Supreme Court
precedent that referred to this electoral appointment power as

185

Id. (“[E]ven if . . . [there is] an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution . . . it would not follow that the requirement of a pledge
in the primary is unconstitutional.”).
186
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020).
187
See id. at 2323.
188
See id.
189
Ray, 343 U.S. at 230.
190
Chiafalo, 591 U.S. at 2323–24.
191
Id. at 2324.
192
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).
193
Id.
194
Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 19–20.
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“plenary,” “exclusive,” and “comprehensive.”195 It maintained that
the Tenth Circuit’s finding that state appointment power ceases once
an elector begins balloting leaves state appointment power “hollow,
rendering [states] powerless to vindicate their [appointment] rights
under Article II.”196
Under precedent set in McPherson v. Blacker, the Court interpreted the clause “as ‘convey[ing] the broadest power of determination’ over who becomes an elector.”197 In McPherson, Michigan
electors contested the constitutionality of a Michigan law that called
for the appointment of electors by congressional district.198 Upholding Michigan’s ability to do so, the Court set important precedent.199
The Court noted that the Constitution does not prohibit nor require
any method of appointment.200 While recognizing “that the word
‘appoint’ is not the most appropriate word to describe the result of a
popular election[,]”201 the Court found “it is sufficiently comprehensive to cover that mode, and was manifestly used as conveying the
broadest power of determination.”202 As such, the ability to direct
the appointment of electors is left “exclusively” to the state legislature.203
In Chiafalo, the Court reasoned that a state’s ability to appoint
electors “in any manner” includes imposing conditions to

195

Id. at 20 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27, 35 (1892)).
Id. at 20 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803)
(“[E]very right, when withheld, must have a remedy.”)).
197
Id. at 20 (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 27).
198
McPherson, 146 U.S. at 24–25 (“The manner of the appointment of electors directed by the act of Michigan is the election of an elector and an alternate
elector in each of the twelve congressional districts into which the State of Michigan is divided, and of an elector and an alternate elector at large in each of two
districts defined by the act.”). The Michigan electors argued that appointing electors by district infringed on the rights of voters to select and be represented by all
of the state’s electors. See id.
199
Id. at 41–42.
200
Id. at 27 (“The Constitution does not provide that the appointment of electors shall be by popular vote, nor that the electors shall be voted for upon a general
ticket, nor that the majority of those who exercise the elective franchise can alone
choose the electors.”).
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 35.
196
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appointment.204 This includes the ability to require that “an elector
live in the State or qualify as a regular voter during the relevant time
period.”205 Of course, this power is second to the Constitution.206
Such conditions to appointment are not immune from other constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protections Clause.207 However, “nothing in the Constitution expressly prohibits States from
taking away presidential electors’ voting discretion.”208 Thus, the
Court concluded that state pledges are merely conditions of appointment well within state power.209
2. THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT
In further support of its reading of Article II, the Court pointed
to historical practices and the enactment of the Twelfth Amendment.
The Court held that the Constitution is “barebones about electors”
and expressed that, if the Founders intended for the Electoral College to be an independent body unencumbered by state control, they
could have clearly done so.210 Mr. Baca argued that the Twelfth
Amendment made clear that state appointment power ceased after
electors were selected; therefore, Mr. Baca reasoned that Colorado
could not remove him from the Electoral College once he cast his
ballot.211 Pointing to its historical adoption, Colorado contended that
the Twelfth Amendment merely solved the problem of a split-ticket
president and vice president and that it did not provide grounds for
finding validity in elector discretion.212 Colorado wrote that:
The Twelfth Amendment thus permitted the voting
public to select electors who would “vote for the
party candidates for both offices,” allowing them to
“carry out the desires of the people, without
204

Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020).
Id. at 2324.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 2324 n.4.
208
Id. at 2324.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 2324–27 (reasoning that Framers could have included language in
Constitution similar to language in the Constitutions of Maryland and Kentucky
at the time).
211
Baca Brief in Support of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 20.
212
Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 22.
205
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confronting the obstacles which confounded the
election[] of . . . 1800.” If anything, the Twelfth
Amendment supports the contemporary practice of
binding electors, not conferring independence on
them. It was the solution to the unique problems
posed when electors are pledged and bound to the
candidates of their declared party. Without that historical practice, dating back to at least 1800, the
Twelfth Amendment would not have been necessary
in the first place.213
The Court agreed.214 It reasoned that faithless electors did not pose
enough of a problem for the Framers to take interest in combating
elector independence at the time of the ratification of the Twelfth
Amendment.215 Instead, the primary concern was split-party tickets
during a rise in allegiance to political parties.216 The Twelfth
Amendment “brought the Electoral College’s voting procedures into
line with the Nation’s new party system[,]” and by 1832, “all States
but one had introduced popular presidential elections.”217Although
some Framers penned their expectations that “the Electoral College
would ‘be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens,’ whose choices would reflect ‘discretion and discernment[,]’”
such words never made it into the Constitution.218 In fact, as early
as 1833, courts and commentators recognized that “exercise of an
independent judgment [by an elector] would be treated[] as a political usurpation, dishonourable to the individual, and a fraud upon his
constituents.”219

213

Id. at 22–23 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ray v.
Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 n.11 (1952)).
214
See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324–25 (finding primary purpose of the
Twelfth Amendment was to solve split-party outcomes).
215
See id. at 2324–26.
216
Id. at 2327.
217
Id. at 2321.
218
Id. at 2325–26 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 391 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
219
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §1457, 322 (1833).
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3. THE MEANING OF A “VOTE”
The Court examined Mr. Baca’s argument that the use of the
words “elector,” “vote,” and “ballot” in the Constitution demonstrated the Framers intent for the Electoral College to vote freely.220
Because interpreting the Constitution requires one to look at how
the vocabulary would have been understood at the time of drafting,
it is worth examining several early American dictionaries.221 In
1785, the word “elector” was defined as someone “that has a vote in
the choice of any officer”222 or “[o]ne who chooses, one who has a
vote in the choice of any public officer.”223 “To vote” was defined
as, “[s]uffrage; voice given and numbered,”224 and as a “[v]oice,
[a]dvice, or [o]pinion of a [m]atter in [d]ebate.”225 Lastly, dictionaries defined “ballot” as “[a] little ball or ticket used in giving votes,
being put privately into a box or urn.”226 Further, “to ballot” was
defined as “putting little balls or tickets, with particular marks, privately in a box; by counting which, it is known what is the result of
the poll, without any discovery by whom each vote was given.”227
The Court did not find that any of the language in the Constitution implies individual discretion.228 It made an important distinction that, while a vote is choice, a vote does not “always connote
220

Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2325–26.
See id.; United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) (“The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used
in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.”).
222
Elector, 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1785).
223
Elector, 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1775); see also Elector, THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM
PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (14th ed. 1771) (defining “elector” as “a person who has a right to elect or choose a person into an office”);
Elector, NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1806) (defining “elector” as “one who elects,” and “elect” as “to
choose, select for favor, prefer”).
224
JOHNSON, supra note 222, at Vote.
225
Vote, NATHAN BAILEY, A UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (20th ed.1765).
226
JOHNSON, supra note 222, at Ballot; see also ASH, supra note 223, at Ballot
(defining “ballot” as “[t]o choose by dropping a little ball or ticket into a box; to
choose by holding up the hand”).
227
JOHNSON, supra note 222, at To Ballot (emphasis added).
228
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2325–26 (2020).
221
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independent choice.”229 The Court pointed to voting mechanisms
like proxy voting where one casts a ballot on behalf of another in
accordance with the principal’s wishes.230 In that instance, balloting
does not encompass the freedom to vote as one pleases.231 Additionally, the Court provided examples of when a vote is valid even if the
result of outside influence, including the guidance of unions, pastors, and spouses.232 Yet, whether a vote necessarily connotes an independent choice does not in itself negate the practice of state
pledges.233 Rather, it is the finding that states may regulate this discretion as a condition of appointment that matters in this case.234
C.
The Tenth Amendment: Powers Reserved to the States
Colorado looked to the Tenth Amendment, arguing that it provided an alternative ground for state control of electors.235 Colorado
pointed to Supreme Court precedent to illustrate that “the Framers
intended the States to ‘keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth
Amendment, the power to regulate elections.’”236 The Tenth
Amendment reads, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.”237 Amidst public fear of
a strong national government, states ratified the Tenth Amendment,
as part of the Bill of Rights, to confirm elements of state sovereignty.238 Colorado argued that while the Federal government
229

Id. (“[V]oting is still voting when discretion departs.”).
Id. at 2325.
231
See id.
232
Id. (“Suppose a person always votes in the way his spouse, or pastor, or
union tells him to. We might question his judgment, but we would have no problem saying that he “votes” or fills in a “ballot.”).
233
See id. at 2325–26.
234
See id. at 2326. It is important to keep in mind that States are under no
requirement to bar electors from exercising independent judgement. See id at
2328.
235
Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 26.
236
Id. (quoting Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013)).
237
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
238
See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931) (“The Tenth
Amendment was intended to confirm the understanding of the people at the time
the Constitution was adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were
reserved to the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as originally ratified . . . .”).
230
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regulates national elections, the states retain power to “prescribe the
qualifications of its officers,”239 including the power to “establish
qualifications” for their presidential electors.240
The Supreme Court majority did not address the Tenth Amendment in its opinion; instead, the Court found support for pledge laws
in Article II.241 Contrarily, Justice Thomas, who concurred in the
judgment, found that support for state pledge requirements stems
from the Tenth Amendment, not Article II.242 Justice Thomas relied
heavily on a narrow application of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, consistent with the reasoning he expressed there in his
dissenting opinion.243 Justice Thomas maintained that “‘[w]here the
Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power[,] that
is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by necessary implication,’ the power is ‘either delegated to the state government or retained by the people.’”244 In agreement with the majority that nowhere in the Constitution are states expressly granted
or prohibited the power to enact and enforce state pledges, Justice
Thomas found that the Tenth Amendment provides Constitutional
support for the practice of state pledges.245
The issue the concurring opinion took with the majority concerned the interpretation and application of “‘Manner’” in Article
II.246 The concurrence felt that the majority’s reading of Article II
was too broad and argued that nothing about state pledge laws concerns appointment.247 Thus, including “the power to impose requirements as to how the electors vote after they are appointed” within
Article II’s delegation of appointment power, bends the language

239

Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 26 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
240
Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 861 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
241
See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2324 (2020).
242
Id. at 2329, 2333 (Thomas, J., concurring).
243
See id. at 2329.
244
Id. at 2334 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514
U.S. at 847–848 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
245
Id. at 2333–34.
246
Id. at 2330 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 1).
247
See id. at 2331 (finding that Washington’s pledge law “simply regulated
electors’ votes, unconnected to the appointment process”).
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into something it is not.248 Justice Thomas compared Article II, Section 1, Clause 2,249 with the Elections Clause, Article I, Section 4,
Clause 1.250 In U.S. Term Limits, Inc., the Court held that “‘Manner’
in Article I includes only ‘a grant of authority to issue procedural
regulations,’ not ‘the broad power to set qualifications.’”251 The argument followed that “Manner” in Article II could not include the
ability to set qualifications for electors; instead, that power stemmed
from the Tenth Amendment.252
However, this argument fails to recognize the difference between the role of an elector and the role of a member of Congress.
Members of Congress are “officer[s] of the union, deriving [their]
powers and qualifications from the constitution, and [are] neither
created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by the states.”253 An
elector is an integral piece of a larger voting process used to elect
the president and vice president, not an officer of the federal government.254 As such, an elector’s oath to support the winner of the
popular vote does nothing more than create a system for representing the will of the people. As was the case in U.S. Term Limits, Inc.,
imposing qualifications for members of Congress beyond those

248

Id. at 2330.
Id. at 2329–31. “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
250
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2329–31 (Thomas, J., concurring). “The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4,
cl.1.
251
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2331 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832– 833 (1995) (majority opinion)). Justice Thomas took issue with the Court’s finding that “Manner” in Article I and
Article II granted different powers. Id.
252
See id. at 2333–35.
253
U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 803 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 627, 435 (3d ed.
1858)).
254
See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1952) (“The presidential electors . . . are not federal officers or agents any more than the state elector who votes
for congressmen. They act by authority of the state that in turn receives its authority from the federal constitution.”).
249
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outlined in the Constitution limits who is eligible to run for office.255
Conversely, pledge laws have no bearing on the eligibility of candidates for president and vice president. Pledge laws are procedural in
nature because they protect the integrity of individual voters rather
than alter qualifications for the national legislature.256 Although not
addressed by the majority, precedent set in U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
makes clear that “[s]tates are . . . entitled to adopt ‘generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.’”257 Pledge laws do exactly that
by creating a system that reflects the “fundamental principle of our
representative democracy” that “the people should choose whom
they please to govern them.”258
V.
THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
While the Court’s opinion assuages potential issues with the
Electoral College, it addresses just the tip of the iceberg. The majority upheld state pledge laws under a broad interpretation of Article
II appointment power, without much comment on the bounds of
such power.259 Under existing laws, broad state power may be necessary; however, considering the decision and the rise in societal
challenges to the traditional function of the Electoral College, congressional action should be taken before new problems arise.
A.
Filling in Constitutional Gaps
Broad state power may be necessary when one thinks about the
holes left by the Framers. The Constitution is not perfect and did, in

255

U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 837–38.
See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328.
257
U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 834 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
258
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (quoting a speech by Alexander Hamilton in 2 JOHN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 257 (2d ed.
1836)).
259
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328–29. The Court noted that the decision does not
validate state pledges requiring electors to vote for deceased candidates, id. at
2328 n.8, nor does it permit state pledges that frustrate other provisions of the
Constitution, see id. at 2324 n.4.
256
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fact, leave many questions unanswered.260 The Supreme Court’s
green light to enforcing state pledges protects the integrity of state
popular votes in states that require them; but, some question whether
the Supreme Court was the correct body to address this issue.261 Under the Twelfth Amendment, the president of the Senate counts the
electoral votes before the House of Representatives and Senate.262
Because Congress counted the electoral votes of Washington and
Colorado in 2016, some argue that Congress approved of the states’
actions and that there was no need for judicial action.263
However, this argument fails to take into account the intricacies
of election processes and state pledge laws, which can also involve
civil penalties.264 Waiting on congressional action weeks after popular votes are conducted is unrealistic and inefficient, and Congress’s validation of such a small percentage of faithless elector
votes is not indicative of congressional power.265 Further, Congress
counted the electoral votes of Washington electors who disobeyed
state law, as well as the electoral votes of the Colorado replacement
electors.266 Such actions are more akin to simple procedure than a
conscious decision to comment on the validity of individual state
actions. Congress had no choice to make, especially when considering Colorado’s faithless electors did not submit their votes to the
Senate.267 Ultimately, the Electoral College as it stood was a ticking
time bomb.268 The Supreme Court rightfully stepped in to interpret
the basic construction of the Electoral College and its constitutional
function in today’s political climate. Chiafalo confirmed that
260

See, e.g., id. at 2324 (describing Constitution as “barebones,” regarding
guidance on electors).
261
See Derek Muller, Leave Courts out of Presidential Elector Dispute,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 22, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/04/symposium-leave-courts-out-of-presidential-elector-dispute/.
262
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
263
Muller, supra note 261.
264
See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322 (noting that at the time of the 2016 elections, electors in Washington faced civil penalties for failing to comply with
pledge laws).
265
See id. at 2328 (“Congress’s deference to a state decision to tolerate a faithless vote is no ground for rejecting a state decision to penalize one.”).
266
163 CONG. REC. H189 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017).
267
See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 920 (10th Cir. 2019), rev’d
per curiam, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
268
See supra Part III.E (discussing varied state appointment conditions).
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electoral power is not absolute and must comply with state appointment laws. Left unanswered are the bounds of such appointment
powers. Some argue that Congress cannot interfere with state appointment power,269 but is election of the most powerful federal office beyond federal regulation?
1. BROAD STATE POWER IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPREHENSIVE
FEDERAL LAW
There are several issues surrounding the Electoral College that
neither the Constitution nor federal law address. Given that electors
are elected in November and cast their votes in December,270 there
are myriad issues that could arise, including arrest or illness, of either the elector or candidate. Colorado argued that the ability to remove electors is necessary in events such as when an elector refuses
to cast a vote, or votes for a candidate who does not meet the constitutional qualifications for president.271 In fact, states have enacted
laws allowing electors to be replaced in cases of “death, sickness[,]
resignation or otherwise.”272 States have also enacted laws expressly
allowing for elector discretion when a candidate dies before electoral votes are cast.273 Such state laws demonstrate that states require
the power to ensure that electors are present and comply with the
Constitution.274
Additionally, electors are not bound by federal transparency
laws, unlike other political candidates and officials who must disclose certain financial contributions.275 In theory, electors can sell

269

See Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power Over Presidential Elections: Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 851, 875 (2002) (stating that Congress cannot “tamper with basic
state rues about the selection of presidential electors”).
270
Whittington, supra note 54, at 906.
271
See Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 23–24.
272
Id. at 24 (citing 1800–1801 Mass. Acts 172–73).
273
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 n.8 (2020).
274
See Colorado Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 24.
275
See States Can Require Presidential Electors to Follow Popular Vote, U.S.
Supreme Court Rules, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (July 6, 2020), https://campaignlegal.org/press-releases/states-can-require-presidential-electors-follow-popularvote-us-supreme-court-rules (discussing potential bribery of the Electoral College).
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their vote without the public having any knowledge.276 Although societal expectations and moral high grounds have kept electors overwhelmingly in line with supporting the popular vote,277 the public
should be protected from loopholes in the structure of the Constitution.
Congress recognizes state power to settle issues that arise surrounding electoral appointment in the Electoral Count Act (the
“ECA”). The ECA expressly gives states the power to make a “final
determination” over “any controversy or contest” over the appointment of an elector.278 State failure to resolve election issues results
in congressional review.279 The Supreme Court has never commented on the constitutionality of the ECA outright; however, Justice Breyer expressed approval of the ECA in his dissent in Bush v.
Gore. Putting constitutionality aside, the ECA is a clear indicator
that some level of congressional control over elections is necessary
and accepted.280 Given the ambiguities in federal election practices,

276

Id.
See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2328 (discussing rarity of faithless electors).
278
3 U.S.C. § 5 (such determination must be “made at least six days prior to
said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is
concerned”).
279
3 U.S.C. § 15; see Coenen & Larson, supra note 269, at 876 (2002) (noting
that the ECA did not place additional duties on states, but instead, it encouraged
timely reporting).
280
There are several congressional acts that regulate federal elections. The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 upholds the principles of the Equal Protections Clause
and Fifteenth Amendment by prohibiting voting qualifications or standards that
result in the denial of the right to vote. 52 U.S.C. § 10301; see Voting Rights Act
of 1965, HISTORY (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/voting-rights-act (discussing Selma to Montgomery March, which prompted
President Johnson to combat voter discrimination). After the 2000 presidential
election, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act, which established minimum standards for certain election functions that, if met, qualified states to receive additional funding, and created the Election Assistance Commission to review state election procedures. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20921; see also Amanda
K. Myers, Importing Democracy: Can Lessons Learned from Germany, India,
and Australia Help Reform the American Electoral System?, 37 PEPP. L. REV.
1113, 1136 (2010) (discussing voting technology requirements the Help America
Vote Act established).
277
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it can be argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to fill in the gaps left by the Framers.281
2. GRANTING BROAD APPOINTMENT POWER UPHOLDS
FEDERALIST PRINCIPLES
State ability to direct the manner of electoral appointment goes
hand in hand with state power to regulate state elections. Under Article I, Section 4, “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of
Chusing Senators.”282 Accordingly, states employ various laws governing voter eligibility.283 These laws differ mainly on the ability of
convicted felons, as well as the mentally incompetent, to vote.284
Some argue that these incongruencies are solved through independent electors who serve as a check on state power and undue influence
by representing both voters and non-voters.285
Under Supreme Court precedent, these arguments now ring hollow. The Electoral College was not an attempt by the Framers to
achieve equality or protect individual voters—rather, it was a compromise amongst states to maintain federalism.286 This compromise
ultimately left each state nearly complete control over its participation in national government elections and created a system to

281
See Edward B. Foley, Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election: An
Exercise in Election Risk Assessment and Management, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 309,
324–326 (2019) (“Congress, being a political body, expresses the people’s will
far more accurately than does an unelected court.”).
282
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
283
See
generally
Voter
Registration
Rules,
VOTE.ORG,
https://www.vote.org/voter-registration-rules/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (outlining voter eligibility requirements for all states).
284
Id.
285
See Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44
ARIZ. STATE L. J. 1237, 1239 (2012) (examining purpose of the Electoral College).
286
Amanda Onion, How the Great Compromise and the Electoral College Affects Politics Today, HISTORY (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/how-the-great-compromise-affects-politics-today#:~:text=The%
20Great%20Compromise%20was%20forged,smaller%20states%20demanded%
20equal%20representation.
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apportion to each state a number of electoral votes.287 Thus, the Supreme Court’s ruling of broad appointment power is congruent with
the principles of federalism embedded in Article I and Article II.
B.
Looking Towards Reform
The Supreme Court’s findings do not make electoral reform impossible. Various actions can be taken by states to change how electors are required to vote.288 “The District Plan” is an alternative elector appointment system currently used in Maine and Nebraska.289
Under the District Plan, the number of a state’s electors remains
equal to that state’s delegation in the House of Representatives plus
two, one elector for each of the state’s senators; however, the voters
in each congressional district in that state would vote for one elector,290 and the remaining two electors are required to vote for the
candidate who wins the state’s popular election.291 Notably, critics
argue that relying on congressional districts will lead to increased
gerrymandering.292 Alternatively, “The Automatic Plan” requires
electoral votes to be given to the state plurality winner.293
Surprisingly, Colorado’s argument before the Supreme Court included nothing about the National Popular Vote Compact (“the
Compact”), which Colorado enacted, but mentioning its existence
when discussing modern practices and potential alternatives is fitting.294 The Compact is a means of ensuring that the president and
vice president are the winners of the national popular vote.295 The
Compact states that all members will appoint electors who will cast
287

Id.
See Joy McAfee, Should the College Electors Finally Graduate? - The
Electoral College: An American Compromise from its Inception to Election, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 643, 666–70 (2002) (describing various alternatives to current
Electoral College).
289
Id. at 669.
290
Id.
291
Id. at 669–70.
292
Id. at 670.
293
Id.
294
Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular
Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE (Feb. 13, 2020) [hereinafter National Popular Vote
Explanation], https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation.
295
See id. (“[B]ecause of state winner-take-all statutes, five of our 45 Presidents have come into office without having won the most popular votes nationwide.”).
288
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their vote in accordance with the winner of the national popular
vote.296 The Compact has been enacted by fifteen states and the District of Columbia—a total of 196 electoral votes—and will go into
effect once an additional 74 electoral votes join.297
However, even if the Compact is enacted by states holding a majority of the electoral votes, its constitutionality is questionable and
hotly debated.298 Critics point out that the Compact’s language does
not adequately deal with numerous situations, including withdrawals from the Compact, states tampering with elections, and election
recounts.299 Second, critics point to the Compact Clause of Article
I, Section 10, which prohibits states from entering into agreements
with one another without congressional approval.300 Compact supporters rebut this argument by pointing to Supreme Court precedent
that authorizes certain agreements between states.301 Yet, there are
critics who argue that even if not prohibited by the Compact Clause,
it is unconstitutional under Article II.302 In particular, it has been
argued that while states have broad discretion to appoint electors,
doing so based on the winners of the national popular vote in other
states is unconstitutional because the constitutional purpose of electors is to represent the people of their respective states.303
Although there is no ruling on the constitutionality of the Compact, the Court has held that states have broad appointment powers,304 and it may not be unreasonable to conclude that states can
require electors to take pledges to vote for the national popular vote
winner. After all, Article II gives states the “‘broadest power of determination’ over who becomes an elector.”305 Thus, if states and
their citizenry support such agreements, who is to stop them?
296
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Baca and Chiafalo is supported by modern practices and federalist ideologies. The Tenth Circuit made a compelling argument in favor of elector independence,
emphasizing the historical intent of the Framers.306 The Supreme
Court, however, did not shy away from historical intent; rather, the
Court looked beyond the text to early state practices and scholarship.307 The Court’s opinion is an important acknowledgment of
some of the oldest American values—representation in government
and voting. The ruling acknowledges that it is up to the individual
states to determine how to handle electoral appointment procedures.308 Thus, even under a liberal reading of the Constitution, the
basic principles of federalism are kept intact. Those who seek to
abolish or reform the Electoral College must realize the answer lies
not in the Supreme Court but, rather, in the hands of the people, who
must urge Congress or their states’ legislatures, to act. After all, we
live under the “trust of a Nation that here, We the People rule.”309
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